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Abstrat: In this work we study preferene systems natural for the Peer-to-Peer paradigm. Most of them
fall in three ategories: global, symmetri and omplementary. All these systems share an ayliity property.
As a onsequene, they admit a stable (or Pareto eient) onguration, where no partiipant an ollaborate
with better partners than their urrent ones.
We analyze the representation of the suh preferene systems and show that any ayli system an be
represented with a symmetri mark matrix. This gives a method to merge ayli preferene systems and
retain the ayliity. We also onsider suh properties of the orresponding ollaboration graph, as lustering
oeient and diameter. In partiular, studying the example of preferenes based on real lateny measurements,
we observe that its stable onguration is a small-world graph.
Key-words: P2P, stable marriage theory, rational hoie theory, ollaborative systems, BitTorrent, overlay
network, mathings, graph theory
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Systèmes de préférenes ayliques dans les réseaux pair-à-pair
Résumé : Cet artile est onsaré à des systèmes de préférenes naturels dans les réseaux pair-à-pair. La
plupart de es systèmes appartiennent à l'une des trois lasses de préférenes suivantes : globale, symétrique et
omplémentaire. Ces préférenes ont la partiularité d'être ayliques. En onséquene, ils possèdent une unique
onguration stable (au sens de Pareto), où auun partiipant ne peut ollaborer ave de meilleurs partenaires
que ses partenaires ourants.
En analysant leur représentation, nous montrons que tout système de préférenes ayliques peut être re-
présenté par une matrie de notes symétriques. Nous obtenons ainsi une méthode pour fusionner des systèmes
de préférenes ayliques en onservant la propriété d'ayliité. Nous étudions également des propriétés du
graphe de ollaboration de la onguration stable, omme le diamètre ou le oeient de lustering. Sur un
example réel de préférenes basées sur des mesures de latenes, nous observons que la onguration stable a des
aratéristiques petit-monde.
Mots-lés : pair-à-pair, mariages stables, hoix rationnels, systèmes ollaboratifs, BitTorrent, réseaux overlay,
ouplages, graphes
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1 Introdution
Motivation In most urrent peer-to-peer (P2P) solutions partiipants are enouraged to ooperate with eah
other. Sine ollaborations may be ostly in terms of network resoures (onnetion establishment, resoure
onsumption, maintenane), the number of onnetions is often bounded by the protool. This onstraint
enourages the lients to make a areful hoie among others to obtain a good performane from the system.
The possibility to hoose a better partner implies that there exists a preferene system, whih desribes the
interests of eah peer.
The study of suh preferene systems is the subjet of b-mathing theory. It has started forty-ve years
ago with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley on stable marriages [5℄. Although the original paper had a
ertain rereational mathematis avor, the model turned out to be espeially valuable both in theory and
pratie. Today, b-mathing's appliations are not limited to dating agenies, but inlude ollege admissions,
roommates attributions, assignment of graduating medial students to their rst hospital appointments, or
kidney exhanges programs [5, 6, 7, 14℄. The goal of the present paper is to expand b-mathing appliation
domain to P2P networks by using it to model the interations between the lients of suh networks.
Previous work In [10℄ we overed general aspets of the b-mathing theory appliation to the dynamis of the
node interations. We onsidered preferene systems natural for the P2P paradigm, and showed that most of
them fall into three ategories: global, symmetri, and omplementary. We demonstrated that these systems
share the same property: ayliity. We proved existene and uniqueness of a stable onguration for ayli
preferene systems.
Contribution In this artile, we analyze the links between properties of loal marks and the preferene lists that
are generated with those marks. We show that all ayli systems an be reated with symmetri marks. We
provide a method to merge any two ayli preferene systems and retain the ayli property. And nally our
simulations show that real lateny marks reate ollaboration graphs with small-worlds properties, in ontrast
with random symmetri or global marks.
Roadmap In Setion 2 we dene the global, symmetri, omplementary, and ayli preferene systems, and
provide a formal desription of our model. In Setion 3 we demonstrate that all ayli preferenes an be
represented using symmetri preferenes. We onsider omplementary preferenes in Setion 4, and the results
are extended to any linear ombination of global or symmetri systems. Setion 5 disusses the properties of a
stable solution providing an example based on Meridian projet measurements [13℄. In Setion 6 we disuss the
impat of our results, and Setion 7 onludes.
2 Denition and appliations of P2P preferene systems
2.1 Denitions and general modeling assumptions
We formalize here a b-mathing model for ommon P2P preferene systems.
Aeptane graph Peers may have a partial knowledge of the network and are not neessarily aware of all
other partiipating nodes. Peers may also want to avoid ollaboration with ertain others. Suh riteria are
represented by an aeptane graph G(V,E). Neighbors of a peer p ∈ V are the nodes that may ollaborate
with p. A onguration C is a subset C˜ ⊂ E of the existing ollaborations at a given time.
Marks We assume peers use some real marks (like lateny, bandwidth,. . . ) to rank their neighbors. This is
represented by a valued matrix of marks m = {m(i, j)}. A peer p uses m(p, i) and m(p, j) to ompare i and j.
Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 is the best mark and m(p, i) < m(p, j) if and only if p prefers i to j.
If p is not a neighbor of q, then m(p, q) =∞. We assume for onveniene a peer p has a dierent mark for eah of
its neighbors. It implies that a peer an always ompare two neighbors and deide whih one suits better to him.
Preferene system A mark matrixM reates an instane L of a preferene system. L(p) is a preferene list that
indiates how a peer p ranks its neighbors. The relation when p prefers q1 to q2 is denoted by L(p, q1) < L(p, q2).
Note that dierent mark matries an produe the same preferene system.
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Global preferenes A preferene system is global if it an be dedued from global marks (m(i, p) = m(j, p) =
m(p)).
Symmetri preferenes A preferenes system is symmetri if it an be dedued from symmetri marks
(m(i, j) = m(j, i) for all i, j).
Complementary preferenes A preferenes system is omplementary if it an be dedued from marks of the
form m(i, j) = v(j)− c(i, j), where v(j) values the resoures possessed by j and c(i, j) the resoures that i and
j have in ommon1.
Ayli preferenes A preferenes system is ayli if it ontains no preferene yle. A preferene yle is a
yle of at least three peers suh that eau peer stritly prefers its suessor to its predeessor along the yle.
Quotas Eah peer p has a quota b(p) (possibly innite) on the number of links it an support. A b-mathing is
a onguration C that respets the quotas. If the quotas are greater than the number of possible ollaborations,
then simply C = E would be an optimal solution for all.
Bloking pairs We assume that the nodes aim to improve their situation, i.e. to link to most preferred neighbors.
A pair of neighbors p and q is a bloking pair of a onguration C if {p, q} ∈ E \ C and both prefer to hange
the onguration C and to link with the eah other. We assume that system evolves by disrete steps. At any
step two nodes an be linked together if and only if they form a bloking pair. Those nodes may drop their
worst performing links to stay within their quotas. A onguration C is stable if no bloking pairs exist.
Loving pair Peers p, q form a loving pair if p prefers q to all its other neighbors and q, in its turn, prefers p to
all other neighbors. It implies a strong link whih annot be destroyed in the given preferene system.
2.2 Preferene systems and appliation design
Depending on the P2P appliation, several important riterion an be used by a node to hoose its ollaborators.
We introdue the following three types as representative of most situations:
Proximity: distanes in the physial network, in a virtual spae or similarities aording to some harateristis,
Capaity related: network bandwidth, omputing apaity, storage apaity,
Distintion: omplementary harater of resoures owned by dierent peers.
Notie that theses types orrespond respetively to the denitions of symmetri, global and omplementary
preferene system ategories.
Examples of symmetri preferenes are P2P appliations whih optimize latenies. A lassial approah
for distributed hash-table lists of ontats is seleting the ontats with the smallest round trip time (RTT)
in the physial network. In Pastry [15℄, a node will always prefer ontats with smallest RTT among all the
ontats that an t into a given routing table entry. More generally, building a low lateny overlay network
with bounded degree requires to selet neighbors with small RTTs. Optimizing latenies between players an
also be ruial, for instane, for online real-time gaming appliations [11℄. Suh preferenes are symmetri sine
the mark a peer p gives to some peer q is the same as the mark q gives to p (the RTT between p and q).
Similarly, massively multiplayer online games (MMOG) require onneting players with nearby oordinates
in a virtual spae [9, 8℄. Again this an be modeled by symmetri preferenes based on the distane in the virtual
spae. Some authors also propose to onnet partiipants of a le sharing system aording to the similarity of
their interests [3, 16℄, whih is also a symmetri relation.
BitTorrent [2℄ is an example of a P2P appliation that uses a apaity related preferene system. In brief,
a BitTorrent peer uploads to peers it has most downloaded from during the last ten seonds. This is an
implementation of the well known Tit-for-Tat strategy. The mark of a peer an thus be seen has its upload
apaity divided by its ollaboration quota.
This global preferene nature of BitTorrent should be tempered by the fat that only peers with omplemen-
tary parts of the le are seleted. Pushing forward this requirement would lead to another seletion riterion for
BitTorrent: preferene for the peers possessing the most omplementary set of le piees. In other words, eah
1
Of ourse, in this ase the preferred neighbor has a larger mark.
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peer should try to exhange with peers possessing a large number of bloks it needs. We all this a omplemen-
tary preferene system. Note, that this kind of preferenes hanges ontinuously as new piees are downloaded.
However, the peers with the most omplementary set of bloks are those, who enable longest exhange sessions.
In its more general form, the seletion of partners for ooperative le download an be seen as a mix of
several global, symmetri, and omplementary preferene systems.
3 Ayli preferenes equivalene
In [10℄, we showed that global, symmetri and omplementary preferenes are ayli, and that any ayli
b-mathing preferene instane has a unique stable onguration. And ayli systems always onverge toward
their stable onguration. However, sine ayliity is not dened by onstrution, one an ask if other kind of
ayli preferenes exist. This setion is devoted to answer this question.
Theorem 1. Let P be a set of n peers, A be the set of all possible ayli preferene instanes on P , S be the
set of all possible symmetri preferene instanes on P , G be the set of all possible global preferene instanes,
then
G $ A = S
The rest of this setion onsists of the proof of theorem 1: we will rst show S ⊂ A and G ⊂ A, then A ⊂ S,
whih will be followed by G 6= A.
Lemma 1. Global and symmetri preferene systems are ayli
Proof. from [10℄ Let us assume the ontrary, and assume that there is a irular list of peers p1, . . . , pk (with
k ≥ 3), suh that eah peer of the list stritly prefers its suessor to its predeessor. Written in the form of
marks it means that m(pi, pi+1) < m(pi, pi−1) for all i modulo k. Taking a sum for all possible i, we get
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi+1) <
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi−1).
If marks are global, this an be rewritten
∑k
i=1
m(pi) <
∑k
i=1
m(pi), and if they are symmetri,
∑k
i=1
m(pi, pi+1) <∑
k
i=1
m(pi, pi+1). Both are impossible, thus global and symmetri marks reate ayli instanes.
The next part, A ⊂ S, uses the loving pairs desribed in 2.1. We rst prove the existene of loving pairs in
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. A nontrivial ayli preferene instane always admits at least one loving pair.
Proof. A formal proof was presented in [10℄. In short, if there is no loving pair, one an onstrut a preferene
yle by onsidering a sequene of rst hoies of peers.
Algorithm 1: Constrution of a symmetri note matrix m given an ayli preferenes instane L on n
peers
N := 0
for all p and q, m(p, q) = +∞ (by default, peers do not aept eah other)
while there exists a loving pair {a, b} do
m(a, b) := m(b, a) := N
Remove a from the preferene list L(b) and b from L(a)
N := N + 1
Lemma 3. Let L be a preferene instane. Algorithm 1 onstruts a symmetri mark matrix in O(n2) time
that produes L.
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Proof. The matrix output is learly symmetri. Neighboring peers get nite marks, while others have innite
marks. If an instane ontains a loving pair {a, b} then m(a, b) = m(b, a) an be the best mark sine a and b
mutually prefer to any other peers. Aording to Lemma 2 suh a loving pair always exists in ayli ase. By
removing the peers a and b from their preferenes lists, we are lead to a smaller ayli instane with the same
preferene lists exept a and b are now unaeptable to eah other. The proess ontinues until all preferene
lists are eventually empty. The marks are given in inreasing order, therefore when m(p, q) and m(p, r) are
nite, m(p, q) < m(p, r) i the loving pair {p, q} is formed before the loving pair {p, r} i p prefers q to r.
The algorithm runs in O(n2) time beause an iteration of the while loop takes O(1) time. A loving pair an
espeially be found in onstant time by maintaining a list on all loving pairs. The list is updated in onstant
time sine, after a and b beame mutually unaeptable, eah new loving pair ontains either a and its new rst
hoie, or b and its new rst hoie.
All ayli preferenes are not global preferenes. A simple ounter-example uses 4 peers p1, p2, p3 and p4
with the following preferene lists:
L(p1) : p2, p3, p4 L(p2) : p1, p3, p4 L(p3) : p4, p1, p2 L(p4) : p3, p1, p2
L is ayli, but p1 prefers p2 to p3 whereas p4 prefers p3 to p2. p1 and p4 rate p2 and p3 dierently, thus
the instane is not global.
4 Complementary and Composite Preferene Systems
Complementary preferenes appear in systems where peers are equally interested in the resoures they do
not have yet. As said in Setion 2.1, omplementary preferenes an be dedued from marks of the form
m(p, q) = v(q)− c(p, q) (in this ase, marks of higher values are preferred).
The expression of a omplementary mark matrix m shows it is a linear ombination of previously disussed
global and symmetri mark matries: m = v − c, where v denes a global preferene system and c denes a
symmetri system.
Theorem 2 shows that omplementary marks, and more generally any linear ombination of global or sym-
metri marks, produe ayli preferenes.
Theorem 2. Let m1 and m2 be global or symmetri marks. Any linear ombination of λm1 + µm2 is ayli.
Proof. The proof is pratially the same as for Lemma 1. Let us suppose that the preferene system indued
by m = λm1 + µm2 ontains a preferene yle p1, p2, . . . , pk, pk+1 = p1, for k ≥ 3. We assume wlog that m1 is
global, m2 symmetri and that marks of higher values are preferred for m. Then m(pi, pi+1) > m(pi, pi−1) for
all i modulo k. Taking a sum over all possible i, we get
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi+1) >
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi−1) =
k∑
i=1
(λm1(pi, pi−1) + µm2(pi, pi−1)) , but
k∑
i=1
(λm1(pi, pi−1) + µm2(pi, pi−1)) = λ
k∑
i=1
m1(pi−1) + µ
k∑
i=1
m2(pi−1, pi)
= λ
k∑
i=1
m1(pi+1) + µ
k∑
i=1
m2(pi, pi+1)
=
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi+1).
This ontradition proves the Theorem.
Theorem 2 leads to the question whether any linear ombination of ayli preferenes expressed by any
kind of marks is also ayli. The example bellow illustrates that in general it is not true:
M1 =


0 3 1
2 0 1
3 1 0


, M2 =


0 1 2
1 0 3
1 2 0


, M1 +M2 =


0 4 3
3 0 4
4 3 0


The preferene instane indued by M1 +M2 has the yle 1, 2, 3, while both M1 and M2 are ayli (both
produe global preferenes).
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Note, that a linear ombination of two preferene system matries an give dupliates in the marks of a
single node, whih generates ties in preferenes. Ties aet existene and uniqueness of a stable onguration,
depending on how they are handled. If a peer prefers a new node to a urrent ollaborator that has the same
mark, existene is not guaranteed (but if a stable onguration exists, it is unique). If not, existene stands,
but not uniqueness
2
.
However, Theorem 2 provides in onjuntion with Theorem 1 a way of onstruting a tie-less ayli instane
that an take into aount several parameters of the network, as long as all produe ayli preferenes. The
parameters an be onverted into integer symmetri marks using Algorithm 1. A linear ombination using
Q-independent salars produes distint ayli marks.
5 Graph properties of stable ongurations
Many protools use preferene systems that ome from global and symmetri marks. Studying the properties
of the stable onguration for suh protools may give information on the performanes one an expet. In
this Setion, we study onnetivity properties for three ases. Connetivity is extensively studied sine Watts
survey [17℄ on the small world graphs. These graphs are known to have good routing and robustness properties.
They are haraterized by a small (i.e. O(log(n)) mean distanes and high (i.e. O(1)) lustering. The lustering
oeient is the probability for two verties x and y to be linked, giving that x and y have at least one ommon
neighbor.
The ases we onsidered all involved a set of n = 2500 peers, and dier from the marks: the rst uses a
global mark matrix
3
,the seond a random symmetri mark matrix, and the last a lateny mark matrix from the
Meridian Projet [13℄.
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Figure 1: Diameter and lustering oeient of lateny, random symmetri and global marks (2500 nodes)
stable ongurations. Global marks use an underlying Erdös-Rényi G(2500, 0.5) aeptane graph.
Figure 1 shows the properties of the stable onguration for these three marks, as a funtion of the quota b
on the number of links per peer.
Global marks produe onguration with disonneted liques of size b+1 (maximal lustering, and innite
diameter). We had previously observed this lusterization eet in [4℄. It an be lessened by using an Erdös-
Rényi aeptane graph. Then the onguration still has a high lustering oeient, and a high, but nite
diameter (same order of magnitude than
n
b
). This is due to a stratiation eet: peers only link to peers that
have marks similar to them [4℄.
Random symmetri matrix produes ongurations with low diameter and lustering oeient. There
harateristis are similar to those of Erdös-Rényi graphs.
2
Irving and Manlove have performed a rather omplete study on ties [7℄.
3
In absene of tie, all global marks are the same up to permutation
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Real latenies produe both a low diameter and a high lustering oeient. This indiates that the stable
onguration has small-world struture. But it is not a sale-free network [12℄, beause the degree distribution
does not follow a power law (the degrees are bounded by b).
6 Disussion and future work
Stability Deision, whether a stable onguration is a good thing or not, depends on the harateristis and
needs of pratial appliations. If ontinuous link alteration has a high ost (like in strutured P2P networks),
or if the stable onguration has appealing properties (like the small-world properties observed for lateny-
based stable onguration), then it is interesting to let the system onverge. On the other hand, we observed
that global marks result in a stable onguration with high diameter, whih is an undesired feature in most
ases. Moreover, some systems like gossip protools[1℄ take advantage of onstant evolution of the orresponding
aeptane graph. In suh ases, the eventual onvergene would be harmful.
Convergene speed The onvergene speed is an important harateristi, whether the stable solution is desired
or not. In the rst ase, the appliation is interested in speeding up the proess. In the seond ase, the
slower possible speed is preferred instead. Although this question is out the sope of the present work, our
urrent experiments suggest that the onvergene depends on many parameters: the preferene system used,
the aeptane graph, the ativity of peers (details of peers' interation protool), the quotas and others. If
we use as time unit the mean interval between two attempts of a given peer to hange one of its neighbors,
then preliminary results show that onvergene is logarithmi at best, and polynomial at worst. We plan on
providing a omplete study on the inuene of parameters. This should help understanding existing protools
and making them more eient.
Dynamis of preferene systems We have onsidered xed aeptane graph and preferene lists. In real
appliations, arrivals and departures modify the aeptane graph, along with the disovery of new ontats (a
toy example is BitTorrent, where a traker periodially gives new ontats to the lients). The preferene system
itself an evolve in time. For instane, lateny an inrease if a orresponding link has a ongestion problem.
A omplementary preferene system is dynami by itself: as a peer gets resoures from a omplementary peer,
the omplementarity mark dereases.
All these hanges impat the stable onguration of the system. The question is to know whether the
onvergene speed an sustain the dynamis of preferenes or not. Fast onvergene and slow hanges allow the
system to ontinuously adjust (or stay lose) to the urrent stable onguration. Otherwise, the ongurations
of the system may be always far from a stable onguration that hanges too often. The preferable behavior
depends on whether stability is a good feature. This is an interesting diretion for the future work.
7 Conlusion
In this artile, we gave formal denitions for a b-mathing P2P model and analyze the existene of a stable
onguration with preferene systems natural to P2P environment. The term stability in our ase orresponds
to Pareto eieny of the ollaboration network, sine the partiipants have no inentives to hange suh links.
We also showed that in ontrast with systems based on intrinsi apaities, a lateny-based stable onguration
has small-world harateristis.
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